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ABSTRACT 
Analyses of neoliberal labor market restructuring debate whether neoliberalism is homogenizing jobs 
or polarizing them. Analyses of informal employment debate whether such employment is inferior, 
and if so, if it is typically a transition or a trap. This paper speaks to both debates, using a three 
time-point (2006, 2007, 2008) longitudinal survey of retail workers in the state of Tlaxcala, Mexico, 
to contrast workers’ experiences across the spectrum of formal and informal work. Using the 
longitudinal data, the paper compares workers’ trajectories, exploring how they make choices and 
navigate transitions between more formal and more informal work. A qualitative portion of the 
survey permits the comparison of people’s aspirations and insight into how those aspirations shift 
overtime. 
Differences within formal and informal retail sectors loom as large as differences between the two 
sectors. For example, while formal retail workers earned more and in most cases have greater 
earnings growth than informal ones, much of the earnings advantage disappears when we excluded 
formal retail supervisors and managers and focus on rank-and-file workers. Class and gender, in 
addition to market position, structure differential access to better outcomes. Transitions between 
formal and informal work are rare in this sample, and progress toward aspirations are very limited for 
most subgroups. The expansion of retail chains appears to be degrading job quality among informal 
retail workers (through heightened competition), but without leading to better jobs for the typical 
employee in the chains. In addition, large numbers of job-seekers without viable alternatives are 
entering informal retail, once more degrading job quality through added competition.  
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Introduction and Literature 
The country-level impact of neoliberal restructuring on labor markets is hotly debated. One 
central debate concerns the extent and pattern of homogenization or polarization in job quality 
taking place within national workforces (Carré et al., 2012). Whereas some argue that a process of 
work degradation is homogenizing jobs at a low level (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988: 195; 
Gonçalves and Madi, 2011: 107, 109), others have pointed to heightened polarization as the main 
result, and have explored the ways that worker characteristics lead to sorting across divergent 
outcomes (Kalleberg, 2012). More sophisticated investigations of these questions examine not just 
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the evolution of cross-sections of earnings or other measures of job quality, but also the trajectories 
of individuals over their careers, since poor quality jobs are of greatest concern if people are stuck in 
jobs of that quality level (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane, 2005).  
Though this debate, dominated by voices from the North, has focused empirically on formal 
employment, the larger concerns motivating it apply equally to informal work, especially given 
evidence for the expansion of informality, and informalization of nominally formal employment, in 
both the North (e.g. Bernhardt et al., 2008) and the South (e.g. Tilly et al., 2013). It thus connects 
to continuing controversies regarding informal employment. Theoretically, perhaps the longest-
standing discussion in the literature on informality considers whether informal work is dualist (a 
holdover of archaic forms of work organization originating outside the modern economy), legalist 
(entrepreneurship seeking alternative channels due to overly restrictive regulations), or survivalist 
(the last resort of those with no viable economic alternative) (Avirgan, Bivens, and Gammage, 
2005). Empirically, then, there has been much attention to the relative quality of formal and 
informal jobs and to mobility between one status and the other. This literature has particularly 
flourished in Latin America, and we review it selectively below. 
We speak to these debates with a study of formal and informal retail jobs in Mexico. In 
particular, we address three questions. First, to what degree is there divergence or convergence 
between formal and informal retail workers, and within each of these retail subsectors? Second, what 
are the roles of market position, gender, and class in structuring retail workers’ outcomes and 
trajectories? Finally, how has Mexico’s neoliberal economic restructuring, and in particular the 
remaking of the retail sector itself, affected the quality of jobs and the nature of Mexicans’ labor 
market strategies? 
Retail employment presents an ideal setting for exploring these issues, since retail jobs in Latin 
America straddle formal and informal employment, extending from global chains to self-employed 
street vendors. Mexico is of particular interest because it represents a classic case of neoliberal 
restructuring, because formal and informal employment are large and diverse, and because the 
quality of formal and informal work have been extensively studied, giving us a baseline of empirical 
literature (de la Garza, 2012a). In this paper, we draw on a three time-point (2006, 2007, 2008) 
longitudinal survey of retail workers in the state of Tlaxcala, Mexico. Using longitudinal data, we 
can compare trajectories, not just point-in-time outcomes, of workers. We track earnings and 
degree of security and mobility. We also track people’s preferences via questions about aspirations. 
Importantly, longitudinal data enable us to compare people’s experiences with their aspirations, and 
follow how those aspirations themselves shift. We pay particular attention to differences by market 
position, class, and gender. 
Informal work is subject to varied and evolving definitions. We define informal work as work 
that creates legal goods or services, but does not offer the standard terms and benefits specified for 
jobs under law – either because the law does not cover these particular jobs, or because the law is 
not effectively enforced. This definition, which has the advantages of conceptual clarity and broad 
applicability, follows Castells and Portes (1989), and has since been widely adopted (e.g. 
Hussmanns, 2004). To implement the definition, we adopt an elaboration proposed by Cobb, King 
and Rodriguez (2009), who replace the unrealistically rigid ideal-type dichotomy between formal 
and informal work with a more flexible spectrum of formality. They consider four aspects of formality 
(consistency of wage reporting, adherence to labor laws, employment steadiness, and legality of 
working status), noting that various combinations can be observed. Temkin (2008), studying 
Mexico, similarly defines three levels of informality, having one, two, or all three of the 
characteristics of working without a formal contract, lacking social security, or working in 
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establishments that do not issue official receipts. We apply a similar framework to a range of retail 
workers across a spectrum of formality. 
Informal employment is typically viewed as inferior employment (e.g. Fields, 2004). Most 
Mexican researchers have reported results corresponding to this view (Levy, 2008; Negrete, 2012). 
Informal workers themselves seem to agree: Temkin (2009), analyzing an opinion survey of Mexican 
workers, finds informal employees report feeling less satisfied and in control of their work and lives 
than formal employees, but that the informal self-employed are the most unhappy of all. However, a 
growing literature posits that informal work is often superior. De Soto (1989) champions the legalist 
position, arguing that much informal business activity is simply entrepreneurship driven 
underground by excessive regulation. Moreover, according to some data, higher income individuals, 
especially business owners, are more likely to conceal economic activity (Waldinger and Lapp, 
1993). But even at the lower end of the labor market, informal employment may offer higher wages, 
greater schedule flexibility, or other advantages that make it preferable (Maloney, 2004).  
Particularly notable in tackling these questions is a set of studies of longitudinal data in 
Mexico (Bargain and Kwenda, 2011; Maloney, 2003; Gong, van Soest, and Villagomez, 2004), 
Brazil (Bargain and Kwenda, 2011; Ulyssea and Szerman, 2006), Chile (Joubert, 2011), and Central 
America (Funkhouser, 1997) that track transitions between formal and informal employment and 
examine the supply- and demand-side determinants of ending up in one or the other sector. While 
shedding new light on labor market trajectories, it has generated continuing debate about the 
relative quality of formal and informal employment. Maloney (1999) and Bosch and Maloney 
(2007) report that informal workers do better, whereas Bargain and Kwenda (2009-2011) 
distinguish between salaried work, in which formal workers fare better, and self-employment, in 
which, at least in Brazil, informal proprietors earn more.  
This longitudinal literature also generates estimates of the frequency of transitions between 
formal and informal employment. For example, Gong et al. (2004) estimate that as many as 20 
percent of Mexican men and 10 percent of women who started out in the informal sector had 
moved to the formal sector as of one year later. These levels of mobility suggest that for many, 
informality may not be a trap, but just one stop in a longer trajectory. Interestingly, while Gong and 
co-authors find mobility in and out of informal jobs more rapid than for formal ones, Ulyssea and 
Szerman conclude that, at least in Brazil, there is an ‘informality trap’ that sharply reduces exit from 
informality after the first several months. 
Despite these important recent exceptions, most literature on informal employment is cross-
sectional in nature, remaining silent on the question of mobility over time. Moreover, the 
longitudinal analyses cited above are strictly quantitative, omitting variables that capture individuals’ 
perspectives, aspirations, or strategies. Our strategy in this research was to conduct in-person 
interviews in order to learn about these more qualitative aspects of the work experience and 
specifically to assess workers’ degree of goal attainment. Our Mexican sample was small and non-
representative, but stratified to include various sectors of retail. 
As noted briefly above, Mexico, and its retail sector in particular, are of interest for a number 
of reasons. Mexico has experienced thorough-going neoliberalization since the 1980s, with 
concomitant expansion of degraded, precarious, and informal employment (de la Garza, 2012a). 
Shifts in sectoral mix and increasing employer avoidance of labor regulations have expanded 
informality from the labor demand side, whereas anemic overall job creation has expanded the 
supply of desperate workers for whom informal work is the best available option. In 2010, an 
estimated 61 percent of Mexico’s employed worked informally, in the sense of working in non-
registered businesses or in formal businesses but without enjoying basic worker rights (de la Garza, 
2012b). Retail is of interest because, as pointed out above, it includes extensive formal and informal 
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labor components, with giant, modern retailers such as Walmart dominating the formal portion, 
while street vendors anchor the informal end (Tilly, 2006). The rapid expansion of both big-box and 
convenience store chains is very new in Mexico, as in Latin America as a whole. Indeed, the growing 
global dominance of giant retailers is often identified as a central feature of neoliberal globalization 
(Lichtenstein, 2009). In the Mexican context, retail is also the largest single employment sector: 
about one Mexican worker in five works in retail (Tilly and Álvarez, 2006). Among informal 
workers, more than one in three works in informal retail (de la Garza, 2012). Despite this, the retail 
workforce as a whole remains understudied. There are notable studies of street vendors (e.g. Cross, 
1998; Olivo, 2012), but only a few of workers in formal retailers, most of which focus on Walmart 
(e.g. Carré and Tilly, 2013; ProDESC, 2009). The workforce turnover rate in formal retail is 
estimated at 120 percent by the Asociación Nacional de Tiendas de Autoservicio y Departamentales 
(ANTAD), the Mexican retailers’ association, suggesting that longitudinal study is particularly 
appropriate in order to be able to follow workers who pass through retail employment. 
The findings point to complexity rather than simple dichotomies. We find that on average, 
formal retail workers earn more and in most cases have greater earnings growth than informal ones. 
However, much of the earnings advantage disappears when we exclude formal retail supervisors and 
managers and focus on rank-and-file workers. We also find large income disparities among informal 
retailers, both by format and within formats. Only a minority of workers in any of the categories 
transitioned out of their initial jobs, and cases of mobility to a different retail sector or out of retail 
altogether are rare indeed – particularly for workers starting out in informal jobs. As regards goal 
attainment, workers in our sample had relatively modest aspirations – above all, to open or expand 
one’s own business. Most made some progress toward those aspirations over the two-year study 
period, but typically the progress was extremely limited, and quite a few workers slipped backwards. 
Confronted with these harsh realities, many lowered their expectations over time. 
In short, we encounter both divergences within retail sub-sectors, but convergence between 
non-managerial formal retail workers and informal retail workers – a combination of polarization 
and homogenization.1 Class and gender, in addition to market position, structure differential access 
to better outcomes. The expansion of retail chains appears to be degrading job quality among 
informal retail workers (through heightened competition), but without leading to better jobs for the 
typical employee in the chains. In addition, large numbers of job-seekers without viable 
alternatives – arguably a product of Mexican neoliberal policies undermining small-scale agriculture 
and import substitution manufacturing – are entering informal retail, once more degrading job 
quality through added competition.  
Methods and Data 
We gathered a convenience sample of 91 workers in food retailing in the state of Tlaxcala, 
Mexico in spring 2006. Tlaxcala is Mexico’s smallest state, located about 100 kilometers east of 
Mexico City in central Mexico. We sampled workers by walking and driving through the 
commercial areas of the major cities of Tlaxcala, entering retail establishments, and inviting workers 
to participate in the study. Workers were concentrated in the capital city of Tlaxcala and its twin 
city, the commercial center of Santa Ana Chiautempan. However, we also included workers in 
several smaller cities. Although we report numbers and percentages, it is important to keep in mind 
that due to the convenience nature of the sample, the statistics are only descriptive of the sample 
itself, and cannot be used for inference about a larger population. 
We intentionally sampled from six sub-sectors covering every channel of food retail in Mexico. 
Table 1 details the sample. From most formal to least formal, the sub-sectors are chain stores, 
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supplier services, mom and pops and public market stands (both with about the same degree of 
formality), tianguis (weekly street market) stands, and independent street vendors. This order is 
based on our assessment of their degree of compliance with legal regulations, and in particular 
accurate reporting to government authorities.  
The initial (2006) interview gathered information on work history, the retail job, earnings 
from that and other jobs, household structure, household income sources, and aspirations for one 
year and five years in the future. In the two subsequent waves, we re-asked all of these questions and 
asked about progress toward aspirations stated earlier. In these later interviews, we asked about the 
current job, regardless of whether it was in retail. However, as we shall see, very few respondents left 
the retail industry. 
Based on these interviews, we operationalize class as education (the lines between incomplete 
secondary education, complete secondary education, and higher education are particularly critical) 
and social capital (contacts, access to assistance from family, and so on). We operationalize market 
position via a set of empirically observed competitive advantages, especially what we call locational 
advantage, meaning location that is central, easily accessible, and/or part of a concentrated retail 
agglomeration.  
Table 1: The Sample and Its Sub-Sectors 
Sub-sector Description Degree of 
formality 















Includes commission wholesale salespeople 
and promotores marketing products to 






















Stands that set up in weekly markets that locate 







Selling out of house or on the street, not in fixed 
location markets or tianguis. Includes some 
purely self-employed and some selling branded 




TOTAL 91 65 
In the initial interview, we gathered varied contact information in order to be able to re-
contact workers in future years. We were able to re-contact 65 (71 percent) of the original 91 
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respondents in spring 2007, spring 2008, or both. We reached all but 6 of those 65 in 2008. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
To obtain quantitative totals across all retail sectors, we weighted the means or proportions 
from each sector by weights based on employment estimates from the 2009 Economic Census for 
stores, suppliers, and public market stands, and based on the 2012 Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación 
y Empleo (ENOE) for tianguis mobile market stands and ambulant street vendors (we thank 
Enrique de la Garza Toledo for ENOE tabulations; contact authors for details of weight 
estimation). 
Because the narrative refers to chains by name, Appendix Table A offers capsule descriptions 
of the chains in the sample. 
Beginning in 2007 and continuing into 2008, the US economy sank slowly into recession (the 
financial crisis exploded later in 2008, after these surveys), and the Mexican economy 
correspondingly slowed down as well. Indicators of labor market distress show that Tlaxcala’s labor 




We present findings in three areas: earnings and earnings growth, security and mobility 
(starting with a summary of workers’ aspirations), and the degree to which aspirations are realized. 
These variables have the advantages of measurability, broad comparability across jobs and over time, 
and relative objectivity. 
 
Earnings levels and changes 
In examining earnings, we seek to discern the degree of convergence or divergence between 
formal and informal retail work, and how recent economic restructuring has affected earnings. Retail 
work, in general, pays much better than minimum wage. However, at around $6.50 per day (in 
purchasing power U.S. dollars), workers who depend exclusively on this daily minimum wage live in 
extreme poverty. In this study, 10 percent of workers earned at or below the minimum wage during 
at least one year. Mexican pesos have been converted to U.S. dollars using the Purchasing Power 
Parities provided by the OECD. 
As shown in Table 2, retail workers and worker-owners in our sample earned an average of 
596 dollars per month ($25 daily) from 2006 to 2008. In the aggregate, more workers in more 
formal businesses – chain stores and supplier services – earned substantially more than those in more 
informal formats. Chain store workers averaged $34 a day and $823 a month, with supplier service 
workers earning even more. In contrast, workers in the less formal formats were clustered around 
$15-20/day and $350-500/month. Each of these averages conceals a wide set of divergences: the 
ratio of lowest to highest monthly pay rates ranged from about 3:1 for supplier services to nearly 9:1 
for the tianguis market. 
Once we separate chain supervisors and managers from everyday employees, new divergences 
and convergences emerge: we find divergence within chain employees, and convergence between low-
end chain employees and informal retail workers. Whereas managerial employees have earnings 
similar to those in supplier services (the highest earner, the owner-manager of an Oxxo convenience 
store, earned $2000 a month), non-managerial chain store workers have lower earnings than workers 
in any of the less formal formats (with the lowest earner, stocking electronics at a Gigante 
superstore, earning only $139/month). The expansion of corporate retail has actually created worse 
jobs for workers at the bottom of the pyramid.  
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Table 2: Annual Monthly & Daily Income (in USD) by Sub-Sector (averages across the three waves) 
 Monthly  Daily 
Chains $823 $34.31 
- Chains-Supervisorial 1,186 49.41 
- Chains-Non-supervisorial 383 15.95 
Supplier Services 1,261 52.54 
Mom and Pop stores 407 16.94 
Public Market 510 21.26 
Tianguis 391 19.53 
Independent street vendors 410 17.06 
TOTAL AVERAGE 565 23.94 
Note: All numbers in Purchasing Power Parity US Dollars (USD) 
Supplier services show stratification of earnings by job category as well. The wholesale 
salespeople (all men) earned considerably more than the store-based promotoras (all women) 
promoting products to customers. Serena [all names are pseudonyms], who promoted dairy 
products, and described her responsibilities as ‘waiting on customers, receiving product and 
checking expiration dates’ earned the least of the supplier services workers, with an average monthly 
salary of $433 in 2006. 
The earnings gaps between various worker categories are shaped particularly by market 
position. The higher average level of daily earnings of supervisors, managers, and sales personnel in 
more formal retail channels is tied to both market position (relative to informal groups) and class 
(relative to frontline workers). Unsurprisingly, formal businesses (chains and supplier services) with 
prime locations, larger formats (offering convenient, quick one-stop shopping), and investments in 
equipment and systems, were able to sell larger volumes and provide higher pay to their upper level 
workers. Supervisory and management positions, middle class jobs which typically require at least 
some college, pay more than line worker positions in the chain stores.  
Different market positions, and in particular locational advantages, also distinguish the various 
less formal channels. The public market – well-known, centrally located, offering a wide variety of 
merchandise and open every day (thus offering convenience relative to other informal formats) –
provided the highest incomes after retail chains, and within the public market, owners of larger or 
multiple stalls earned more than those with smaller, single stalls. Mom and pop stores enjoy the 
advantages of week-long operation in a fixed site, but are less centrally located, offer limited goods, 
and typically just serve customers from a single neighborhood. 
In contrast with the public market and corner stores, tianguis weekly street markets circulate 
to different locations each day of the week, limiting their ability to make capital investments or 
build up a faithful clientele. Vendors in our sample typically specialized in one type of product (for 
example fruits, vegetables, cheese or seeds) and had a very small assortment. Because of the licensing 
system and the time needed to travel from one market to another, vendors at the rotating street 
markets typically have only four days to sell, whereas other businesses are open at least six days a 
week (and are also open longer hours). Importantly, unlike the indoor public market, with a fixed 
number of stalls, tianguis are located outdoors under temporary awnings, and the number of vendors 
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can easily be increased. Thus, tianguis stands have more limited access to consumer demand and are 
more vulnerable to competing supply. 
Independent vendors have the smallest scale, the least capital, and are the least protected from 
entry by other competing sellers. Their situations varied, with most preparing their own 
merchandise (sweets or potato chips, for example) and selling them on the street or in a corner of 
the market without a formal stand. One self-employed vendor sold fruit and vegetables from a stand 
in front of her house, another circulated a sweets cart around the public market, and another sold 
popsicles supplied by the BonIce brand. These businesses were typically constrained by their size; 
control of only a very small space and lack of storage capacity limited the quantity and assortment of 
merchandise to what they could expect to sell in a given day. Even so, their earnings were 
comparable to (and slightly above) their mom and pop counterparts. 
Though earnings of formal retail workers benefit from their business’s competitive advantages 
of central locations and economies of scale, informal workers have access to other strategies to 
increase total household income. Perhaps most importantly, less formal family businesses typically 
deploy unpaid family workers. Most owner-workers in the sample hired family members or 
otherwise depended on their free labor. In calculating monthly and weekly earnings in family 
businesses, we divided by the number of adults working, to avoid inflating earnings estimates. Given 
this adjustment, adult unpaid family workers add nothing to the per-adult earnings we report, but in 
terms of household survival strategy they add to total family income without any added out-of-
pocket cost. 
Another strategy to increase total income is holding multiple jobs. Particularly common is the 
case of people who hold a formal job, but add a flexible, informal job to supplement their income. 
For instance, Carlos worked as a university professor, but his flexible work schedule also permitted 
him to operate first one, then multiple corner stores.  
Real earnings among Tlaxcala retail workers rose by 13 percent between 2006 and 2007, but 
only by 2% between 2007 and 2008 as the slowdown in the US economy rippled through Mexico. 
The changes in earnings are summarized in Table 3. The net growth was concentrated in the more 
formal sectors: chains, vendor services and public markets. In chains, non-managerial workers gained 
more than managers in the upturn, but lost more in the downturn. Surprisingly, public markets were 
the only sector where earnings continued to grow even during the economic downturn that began to 
affect retail in 2007. This sector’s 68 percent increase in income over three years was the highest of 
any sector, followed by supplier services at 59 percent and chains at 20 percent. The rest of the less 
formal sectors all saw negative growth rates. Losses in the tianguis rotating street market sector were 
most dramatic: 100 percent of vendors saw an income decline.  
Worker-owners blamed competition that cut into already low profits, and their analysis 
points out to the continuing effects of neoliberal restructuring. The biggest culprits they pointed to 
are the chains, particularly the gigantic autoservicios offering variety and convenience. Melisa, a public 
market worker, reported that with the opening of Aurrera in 2003, her sales dropped immediately 
by as much as $6.50 per day – the equivalent of her daily income in 2007.  
Some street market vendors reported an increase in hours in order to try to recoup this loss of 
income. Despite increasing their hours, the rising price of inputs and low rates of consumption 
prevented a corresponding rise of income. David, who sold fruit and DVDs at the street markets, 
went from four days a week in 2006 to seven days in 2008, but his income dropped from $612 to 
$348 over the same years – a total decline of 43%. This pattern was noted by people in all of the 
less formal retail sectors. Employees in small and informal businesses reported working increased 
hours for less pay, and worker-owners reported earning less despite long hours.  
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Chains 21% -1% 20% 
- Chains-Supervisorial 13% -1% 12% 
- Chains-Non-supervisorial 34% -9% 22% 
Supplier Services 35% 18% 59% 
Mom and Pop stores -1% -13% -15% 
Public Market 49% 12% 68% 
Tianguis 17% -47% -37% 
Independent street vendors -7% 1% -6% 
ALL Retail Workers 13% 2% 15% 
Note: Includes only workers who stayed in the same retail sector. 
As documented below, this is the overwhelming majority of workers. 
Yet large chains are not the only source of competition. As the economy worsens and the 
supply of job-seekers expands, informal retail is one of the most common industries that workers 
turn to. Very small-scale informal workers who have no overhead costs sometimes create another 
important source of competition that small-business owners face. Public market vendor Melisa 
attributed her dramatic drop in income not only to Aurrera, but also to the emergence of more 
informal vendors. She described a new local government policy to expand the vending zone around 
the public market in order to offer more economic opportunities for the unemployed. As she 
pointed outside to a whole new section of the market where people sold the same goods as her and 
the other workers-owners around her, she said: ‘I think there are too many of us. So much 
competition now…Every year we sell less and less.’  
In brief, two outcomes of neoliberal restructuring – expanded corporate competition and a 
flood of unemployed and underemployed workers – undermined retail workers’ earnings, especially 
in informal retail. Based on our evidence, we cannot definitively answer why public market earnings 
bucked this trend. However, a possible explanation is that in economic hard times, former patrons 
of chain retailers ‘traded down’ to the cheaper but still relatively convenient public markets – much 
as consumers in the United States switched from Walmart to the even lower-priced dollar stores 
during the recession.  
Mobility and security 
A starting point for evaluating mobility and security is to consider what the workers 
themselves hoped to achieve. Worker aspirations, for each sub-sector and for the total, are shown in 
Table 4. Every worker expressed at least one aspiration, and the great majority expressed more than 
one. We classify the goals as advancing within informal employment, advancing within formal 
employment, more general financial goals, and the  ‘exit’ option of migration abroad to seek work. 
By far the most frequent goal expressed by the food retail workers interviewed was to open 
their own business. Over half of all workers hoped to open a business within the next one to five 
years. The most common kind of business that people imagined opening was a small grocery store in 
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front of their homes (typically informal). In addition, most of those who already owned a business 
hoped to expand or improve their business. 
Workers’ reasons for wishing to open a business reflect the disadvantages of corporate 
employment in Mexico’s neoliberal regime – and thus the continuing appeal of informality. First, 
many, even those formally employed at large chains, who might expect to receive a pension, saw 
opening their own business as a sort of social security, recognizing the precariousness and insecurity 
of corporate employment over the longer run.  
Second, many expressed a preference for self-employment due to autonomy, control over 
one’s social time, and social status. Francisco, who rated his sales job in supplier services a 10 on the 
scale of 1 to 10, and considered it very well-paying, still said he planned on quitting as soon as he 
had enough money to invest in a small grocery store: ‘Working for someone else is good, but having 
your own business is better.’  
On the formal side, getting promoted to a higher level position was an objective of most retail 
workers in chains and vendor services. Two-thirds of chain store employees hoped to move up. 
However, this breaks down to almost every supervisor and manager, and less than half of the line 
employees. It is interesting to note that moving up the career ladder was an aspiration most often 
named in conjunction with, rather than exclusive of, opening one’s own business. Three-quarters of 
those who aimed to move up also hoped to open their own business. 
Table 4: Distribution of Aspirations by Sub-Sector (Percentage expressing each aspiration) 
Informal 

















Chains 63% 4% 29% 67% 21% 13% 8% 8% 42% 
Chains: 
Supervisorial 75% 0% 25% 92% 8% 8% 0% 8% 58% 
Chains: Non-
supervisorial 50% 8% 33% 42% 33% 17% 17% 8% 33% 
Supplier 
Service 100% 0% 40% 60% 0% 0% 0% 20% 20% 
Mom & Pops 36% 36% 45% 0% 18% 18% 9% 18% 55% 
Public Market 33% 67% 33% 0% 17% 50% 0% 0% 33% 
Tianguis 38% 63% 25% 0% 13% 63% 13% 0% 63% 
Independent 
Street Vendor 64% 55% 18% 0% 18% 18% 0% 0% 9% 
TOTAL 55% 31% 31% 29% 17% 23% 6% 8% 40% 
Studying – including high school, college, English or computer classes, or further job 
training – was one of the least likely aspirations to be named (in part because of the wide range of 
ages represented in the sample). About one in six retail workers expressed a desire to study more.  
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About one-fifth of workers simply expressed goals of purchasing durable goods such as a house 
or car, saving money, or undertaking the expenses to start a family or help family members advance.  
Finally, forty percent of workers had thought about exiting the Mexican labor market 
altogether and migrating to the United States – joining a stream that has expanded massively in the 
neoliberal era. Interestingly, high percentages of workers not only in informal sectors, but also 
among college-educated retail managers, contemplated this possibility.  
We find that workers’ ability to translate these varied aspirations into reality was limited by 
inequalities within the expanding corporate retail sector, as well as heightened competition driven 
by the expansion of large chains simultaneous with the flood of people without other options into 
informal retail work. 
Workers did strive to better their positions. Most importantly, many workers attempted to 
improve or at least preserve their earnings by changing jobs, including some changes from formal to 
informal employment and vice versa. However, as Table 5 shows, the majority – 57 percent – of 
retail workers remained in their original jobs over the two year span of this study. Most who 
changed jobs did so within the same company. We saw very few cases of workers departing retail 
altogether. A few left the work force outright: all were women who did so because of family 
obligations, and all were from the mom and pop sector.  






















Chains 38% 33% 17% 8% 4% 0% 
Chains 
- Supervisorial 50% 
25% 
25% 0% 0% 0% 
Chains 
-Non-supervisorial 25% 42% 8% 17% 8% 0% 
Supplier Services 60% 20% 20% 0% 0% 0% 
Mom and Pop stores 45% 0% 9% 0% 27% 18% 
Public Market 83% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Tianguis 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Independent street 
vendors 64% 9% 9% 18% 0% 0% 
ALL Retail Workers 57% 17% 9% 8% 6% 3% 
In general, less formal retail channels had more stable employees. Four out of five public 
market worker-owners, and all of the tianguis workers, were in the same job two years later. Given 
the distinct fortunes of public market and tianguis workers, we surmise that the former case 
represents security in a decent job, whereas the latter represents a lack of options – adding to the 
evidence for divergence within informal retail.  
52
At the other extreme, only one-quarter of non-supervisorial chain store employees occupied 
the same job two years later. Among less formal formats, mom and pop stores had exceptionally high 
mobility, but this was entirely due to the women who left to care for children. Many mom and pops 
are supplemental income projects for middle class families, making this kind of exit economically 
feasible. 
Table 6: Job Transitions and Income Changes 
% with Any Job 
Change 
% with Change that Resulted in Higher 
Income 
Chain 63% 80% 
Chains: Supervisorial 50% 83% 
Chains: Non-supervisorial 75% 78% 
Supplier Services 40% 50%* 
Mom and Pop stores 36% 50%** 
Public Market 17% 100%* 
Tianguis 0% -- 
Independent street vendors 36% 50% 
ALL Retail Workers 40% 69% 
* These estimates are based on one to two observations, so are particularly unreliable.
** This estimate only includes people who continued doing paid work, and does not include several 
women who left the paid workforce. 
Table 6 shows the percentage changing jobs within each sector, and the percentage of 
changers who gained earnings via the change. Most job changes resulted in earnings increases, 
especially for those starting out in chain stores and the public market. Importantly, chain store line 
workers’ job changes were overwhelmingly tied to increased income, suggesting that their high 
turnover is linked to upward mobility rather than short-run insecurity. However, they were less 
likely to increase their incomes than chain store managers or public market workers who changed 
jobs, and glancing back at Table 3 reminds us that despite little job movement, public market 
workers enjoyed far larger increases in income than chain store workers or managers.  
Transitions between formal and informal modes of retail were relatively rare. Among the less 
formal retail formats, from mom and pops to independent street vendors, only two people, 6 percent 
of the total, moved into formal jobs – and both outside retail. In the reverse direction, a slightly 
higher 10 percent of chain and supplier service employees (three people) relocated to less formal 
jobs. These frequencies are considerably lower than those estimated by Gong et al. (2004). Thus 
workers’ relatively advantageous or disadvantageous positions tend to persist over time; in 
particular, dreams of successful entrepreneurship are rarely fulfilled. 
Though movements between formal and informal jobs were unusual, workers pursued five 
other main strategies in changing jobs. These include two primarily formal job strategies, climbing 
the corporate ladder and job-hopping; two informal job strategies, starting a business and moving 
from retail into wholesale; and a final option of exiting the Mexican labor market via migration. In 
some cases workers combined more than one strategy. Whereas market position helped explain pay 
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differences across retail categories, workers’ degree of success in pursuing a particular strategy within 
a particular category was especially shaped by gender and class. 
i) Climbing the corporate ladder
Many workers, especially women, run into limits to moving up within a company. While we
found occasional examples of climbing the corporate ladder, most workers felt stuck. Diego, a floor 
worker at a Gigante supercenter, confronted corporate stratification with a class overlay and found 
meaningful upward mobility unattainable:  
‘I’m all alone in my department… I’ve been here nearly two years and I haven’t gotten a raise. 
For my level of responsibility it’s not worth it. When there is a possibility of moving up, they 
might give you the job, but they won’t give you the corresponding salary.’  
Similarly, Eleanora promoted Nestlé products for thirteen years without moving up. Though 
she wished to be supervisor, she knew she would never be offered the job because it required a 
university degree, one of our markers of class.  
ii) Job-hopping
Eleanora ended up job-hopping to another employer, along with more than one-fifth of the
sample. Job-hopping is the most common earnings improvement strategy, but has its limits. Maura, 
working at a mom and pop, when asked about opportunities to find a better job, cited the barriers 
posed by social capital, the other class marker. She responded, ‘Right now there are very few 
[opportunities]. If you don’t know someone who works at the business, they won’t give you a job. 
Jobs are given more on the basis of contacts than skills.’  
iii) Starting a business
As noted above, starting a business is the most common aspiration. Some retail workers
turned this aspiration into a reality during the two-year period. But for most, it did not prove a 
quick road to riches. After years of employment with little advancement, Daniel started selling 
popsicles for BonIce, but was once more disappointed. He was among fifty vendors who had left the 
franchise in 2007. He began selling belts and bags, spreading his wares out on the sidewalk, earning 
an average of 135 dollars weekly for sixty-hour weeks – the same hourly income as before. Though 
he was struggling, he considered his new job an improvement over BonIce. ‘Compared to last year, 
I’m doing better. Last year I just sold juice, I worked for a company. But now I have my own 
business and that’s a good thing. I’ve come up.’ 
Increased competition, including from expanding retail chains, limits new startups’ 
possibilities. Maura, the mom-and-pop employee who was discouraged about the prospects for 
finding a better job, was also pessimistic about her dream of starting a new family business: ‘If you 
look around, there is a business every five steps. Today, it’s harder for a business to get off the 
ground fast.’  
iv) Moving from retail into wholesale
Some of those struggling to make a living in family businesses, particularly entrepreneurial
young men, saw income potential in improving their market position by moving further back on the 
supply chain. David, who had worked at a fruit stand in the tianguis markets since he was 11, did 
successfully move into wholesale. He was 18 at the time of the first interview, and reported 
complementing the family fruit business with his own pirated DVD and CD stand. In 2006, he had 
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just quit selling CDs and DVDs after running the stand for seven years due to repeated police 
confiscations of merchandise.  
Despite closing the stand, David and his brother used their knowledge of the industry to open 
a wholesale business, copying and distributing DVDs to other tianguistas. He estimated selling 20 
boxes of CDs and 20 boxes of DVDs, with total sales of around $6000 per month, and profits of 
around $275. Faced with increasing competition, his income – and with it his job satisfaction –
eroded over the years despite his best efforts: ‘You live from day to day; there’s always going to be 
something that goes wrong.’  
 
v)  Migration 
Nearly 40 percent of all people interviewed had considered migrating to the U.S. at some 
point. David, just mentioned above, pursued this avenue. He migrated to the United States in 2006, 
but was deported after just a short time in the country. By 2008, he was trying to once more save 
enough money to pay for the border crossing later that year. Others said that they might have 
considered migration, but were concerned about the violence along the border, the threat of U.S. 
border patrol and immigration officers, and exploitation on the job. One tianguis worker remarked, 
‘An immigrant suffers to get across the border, and the truth is they look on us as strange insects. 
We’re not valued in the U.S….’  
 
vi)  Multiple strategies 
Examples of combining multiple strategies illustrate that inflexible scheduling in formal retail 
can impede mobility, and that mobility is gendered. Noë’s story illustrates the first. Noë, an area 
lead worker at a Waldo’s convenience store, studied public accounting, but found the schedule 
challenging. ‘I study. Monday I’m here nights and leave Tuesday morning to run to school. On 
Tuesdays, I’m often on the afternoon shift, so from school I come back here and I haven’t slept in a 
day.’ The scheduling issues blocked his ability to advance, but he continued to take steps towards 
his goal to open an accounting firm by taking a related internship and adding a box-making job – 
despite pressure from his family to quit school.  
Many mobility accounts suggest mobility’s gendered nature. Esmeralda, who sold products for 
the large snack company Sabritas in an Aurrera supercenter, saw her opportunities as limited both 
by education and gender.  
 
‘Any company, any vendor services company…if there is a man, they make him 
supervisor…Here, a boy who came in out of nowhere, they gave him a position just because he 
had gone to college. Because he’s a man and he has a certain educational level. I’ve seen it. 
There was a woman who worked with us who also had studied… and it was obvious that she 
was the one who should move up, but they did something, they hired a boy who had his B.A. 
and they left her in the lower position. She quit.’  
 
Trainings, similarly, didn’t promote mobility, in her view. ‘My first course was sales. The 
other courses are about self-esteem, physical and moral development, and then they just repeat. 
They do the same trainings, but with different names.’ 
In addition, it was only women who left jobs to care for children. Even when care duties were 
compatible with a job, they could foreclose further education.  
 
Meeting aspirations, or abandoning them? 
To what extent did people make progress in achieving their aspirations over time? Table 7 
shows that overall, there was only progress toward meeting one-quarter of total aspirations, and less 
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than half of respondents made progress toward any aspiration. Here high-end informal workers 
converge with their formal counterparts, diverging from the groups of informal workers who occupy 
weaker market positions. Chain store and supplier service workers, mom-and-pop stores, and public 
market vendors hit the mark 50-60 percent of the time. On the other hand, tianguis vendors and 
independent street vendors languished; one in six or fewer progressed.  
Some respondents fully met their aspirations, but such success was exceptional. One 
particularly successful case, which amply illustrates class advantages, was Leonel, who started out 
promoting credit cards based at large retailers. Like others in supplier services, he hoped to open his 
own business. Unlike others, he was able to do so within the two-year study period. He doubled his 
credit card promotion income between 2006 and 2007. His high salary, family capital, and 
entrepreneurial attitude made him able to achieve most of his rather ambitious goals: between 2006 
and 2008, he finished his university degree, switched to a more lucrative job in the same field, and 
opened a hotel and a corner store in houses owned by his family.  
But overall, very few people made any progress towards opening a business over two years –
only three of 34 people made progress. More typical than Leonel is the case of Claudia. Claudia, a 
popsicle vendor, hoped to guarantee her family’s livelihood by combining several sources of income, 
rather than just one. She strove to continue studying medicine while selling popsicles, and hoped to 
open her own taco restaurant. During the research period, she continued studying, but, given the 
ease of entry by competing vendors, failed to save money towards other future enterprises.  




















54% 50% 58% 60% 55% 50% 13% 18% 42% 





33% 32% 33% 40% 35% 17% 6% 11% 25% 
People who wished to invest in businesses they already owned – concentrated in the less 
formal sectors – were more likely to make progress over two years. Almost half of the 41 percent of 
the sample with this goal were successful.  
Employees in larger businesses (chains and supplier services), two-thirds of whom hoped to 
move up, were still more successful, as reflected in Table 6. More than half of them did move to a 
better job during the course of this study. For example, Luís, who started out managing a small 
Super D convenience store, moved up to assistant manager of a store that was twice as large in one 
year, and then to managing the store a year later. But Carmina, who had already spent four years as 
assistant manager at a Farmacia Guadalajara drugstore at the time we first interviewed her, still had 
not landed a desired store manager job by two years later – perhaps due to gender-based 
discrimination.  
Indeed, even over a two-year period, many respondents deferred or even abandoned cherished 
dreams. Micaela, an owner of a mom and pop during 2006 interviews, is representative. Micaela had 
% of people 
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gotten loans from family members to open a small grocery store. In 2006, she hoped to open a 
second store and make her business a chain, but a few weeks before the interview in 2007, she 
closed the store. Part of the reason was a shift in priorities: ‘because I had my baby and I don’t have 
anyone I can leave him with, so I have to take care of him.’ Her husband’s stable, relatively well-
paying salary as a graphic designer in the textile industry also helped make her decision not to work 
outside the home possible. But she also highlighted low sales. When Micaela started earning less 
than 13 dollars per day, she shut down. In 2007, she wished to put her baby in a daycare, take 
practical courses in computers, and make crafts to sell, but as of her last interview in 2008, she had 
been unable to do any of these things. 
Some retail workers were so discouraged that, in later years in the sample, they declined to 
state any aspirations. Even goals of making major purchases or setting aside savings proved elusive. 
Of the twenty percent of retail workers who hoped to build their homes, buy a car or buy furniture, 
only a third of them made any headway. Those who did were chain retail workers assisted by loans 
available as part of their benefit packages. More than half of all people were able to save something 
during at least one of the three years that they were interviewed, but only 30 percent of the sample 
was able to save all three years.  
Despite all these setbacks, hope dies hard. Even in 2008 as the economy weakened, the vast 
majority of respondents – 93 percent, even including most of the tianguistas expressing resignation –




The findings in this study speak to many of the central debates on informal employment, but 
again, in ways that point to complexity rather than simple dichotomies. We started the analysis with 
three questions: the degree of convergence or divergence between and within formal and informal 
retail jobs; the roles of market position, gender, and class in determining worker outcomes; and the 
impact of neoliberal restructuring on these labor market outcomes.  
 
Convergence and divergence 
While there are some differences between formal and informal workers, in many ways they are 
overshadowed by inequalities within each of these categories – and convergences across the formal-
informal divide. Within our sample, which is qualitatively representative of variation in urban retail 
employment in the Mexican state of Tlaxcala, the wide pay ranges, differing pay trajectories, and 
disparate rates of goal attainment within each sector underline these divergences. The gaps between 
managers and line workers in formal chains, as well as those between public market workers and 
tianguis or independent vendors in less formal retail, are particularly striking differences. Rank-and-
file workers in chains actually earn less on average than any of the informal retail categories, 
converging with lower-paid informal retail workers. 
 
Determinants of labor outcomes 
Market position – and especially locational capital – is particularly useful in explaining 
differences between subsectors. The public market, for instance, has multiple market position 
advantages: a central location, a wide range of merchandise, and week-long opening hours. Public 
market workers’ gains, as earnings in almost all other sectors slumped, are harder to explain, but 
may be due to consumers switching from chain stores to a cheaper option during the recession. 
When it comes to within-sector differences in individual incomes and trajectories, gender and 
class assume greater prominence. Women report facing labor market discrimination and are more 
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likely to exit the labor market altogether to undertake care work. Class, as proxied by access to 
higher education and social capital, is important in shaping opportunities to move up. 
Neoliberal restructuring’s impact 
The spread of giant chains is one fruit of neoliberal restructuring. The corporate retailers have 
created degraded entry-level jobs and taken a bite of the less formal retail market. At the same time, 
the broader consequences of Mexico’s cocktail of neoliberal policies have generated a growing 
population with no formal employment opportunities, many of whom have joined a survivalist flood 
into informal retail. The resulting pincer movement on informal retail has in particular squeezed the 
tianguis and street vendors, sectors with fewer barriers to entry. Disturbingly, the 55 percent of the 
sample who hoped to start a business were for the most part expressing a hope to enter one of the 
two more troubled sectors we studied: mom and pop stores and tianguis stands (public market slots 
are scarce and expensive, and few aspired to become street vendors). Indeed, quite a few of our 
respondents voiced a clear-eyed analysis of the destructive competition facing small retailers, but 
simultaneously voiced a hope to open a business, or to add another tianguis stand or sell at another 
day’s mobile marketplace. This pursuit of a questionable strategy speaks both to the value people 
place on autonomy and flexibility in the workplace and to the lack of economic options facing many 
in our sample. 
In summary, neither homogenization nor polarization adequately characterizes the relation 
between formal and informal retail work in this Mexican setting. Instead the pattern could perhaps 
best be described as re-stratification, with wide disparities within both formal and informal work. 
The reconfiguration of Mexican commerce and the broader reconfiguration of the country’s 
economy have altered the opportunity structure. Workers continue to harbor aspirations and to 
devise strategies for upward mobility – but on a terrain that, for most, is far from promising. 
NOTES 
1. We have borrowed the title of this article from Katz and Darbishire 2002, who use the phrase
‘converging divergences’ in a different context.
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APPENDIX TABLE A: DESCRIPTIONS OF RETAIL CHAINS 
Chain Description 
Aurrera Autoservicio (hypermarket/supercenter) selling food, clothing, and a wide 
range of other goods, owned by Walmart 
California Vinos y Licores Liquor stores 
Comercial Rivera Medium-sized supermarket 
Extra Convenience store 
Farmacia Guadalajara Drugstore, selling food as well as standard drugstore items 
Gigante Autoservicio (hypermarket/supercenter) selling food, clothing, and a wide 
range of other goods 
ISSSTE State-owned and -operated medium-sized supermarket 
Mini Com Convenience store 
Oxxo Convenience store 
Productos Populares Medium-sized supermarket 
Soriana Autoservicio (hypermarket/supercenter) selling food, clothing, and a wide 
range of other goods 
Super 6 Convenience store 
Super Che Convenience store 
Super D Medium-sized supermarket 
Waldo’s Variety store, somewhat larger than a convenience store, selling food as 
well as other items 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE B: INDICATORS OF LABOR MARKET DISTRESS IN THE STATE OF 
TLAXCALA, MEXICO, 2006-2008 
 Second quarter of: 
 2006 2007 2008 
Unemployment rate 3.6% 4.9% 5.5% 
Underemployment rate  16.2 17.3 
Informal sector employment rate  39.3 37.5 
% of paid workers who lack access to social benefits  56.3 57.5 
Source: INEGI (2012). 
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